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The main idea of this paper is based on the endogenous growth theory. In general, 
the classical Endogenous Growth Models set in the private consumption, but capital 
investment is the by-product of private decision variables. That is to say the 
representative resident, under the constrained budget, optimizes the consumption. 
Such an analytical framework is a simplified reality. In our country, capital investment 
is not just made by private individuals. In particular, in the procedure of our country 
growth, our financial distribution of the crucial public capital investment, such as 
highways, research, education, plays an important role. Therefore, considering the 
family optimization model of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans, meanwhile basing on the 
introduction of government administration to optimize a particular objective, this 
paper attempts to explain that the basic economies’ endogenous variables and welfare 
are not only decided by the resident or family optimize behavior. 
With regard to the arrangement in the analytical framework, firstly, this paper 
establishes a conspiracy model. By comparative analysis with the corresponding 
non-conspiracy optimal decision (namely, decentralized decision-making) model, the 
paper verifies the optimal consumption of the conspiracy model, in some situations, 
results with a lower welfare for residents. For exogenous parameters and in certain 
conditions, a stable structure of collusion does not exist. Secondly, the non-conspiracy 
scenarios, as the behaviors of residents and government administrative agencies are 
affected by the rule of the law, in order to achieve more sophisticated analyses of the 
residents’ and government’ optimization problems, this study takes into account the 
specific constraints of legal rules and then in particular economic scenario, has proven 
its excellent than the conspiracy optimal decision. Meanwhile, this paper 
demonstrates the efficiency of public investment or the different relations of public 
investment and tax rate would lead to different economic variables and different 
welfare of residents and the government administration, and then discusses the 
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开放以来，我国经济实力不断增强，GDP 从 1978 年的 3645.22 亿元增长到 2009
年的 33 万 5353 亿元，但当前我国改善民生的迫切性日益凸显，在教育、就业、
收入分配、社会保障、医药卫生等领域还存在着很多问题，我们贫富差距悬殊，
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